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partnership arrangements from a legal and policy perspective, and in the penultimate section, 
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1: Introduction 
 
The EU as part of its plans to develop a cross-border CO2 transport project that will pave the 
way for an EU CO2 transport network and subsequent deployment of CCS in Europe.  It is 
widely assumed that such a CO2 project – publicly funded, owned and operated by a consortium 
of governmental bodies in several nations – is a necessity to initiate a first-mover project to 
enable widespread deployment of CCS in a European context.   
 
This research focuses on the ownership, risk and legal issues of such a CO2 transport project and 
the relationship between these three issues. The paper uses an example case of the ‘Rotterdam 
Nucleus’ that involves both the Netherlands and the UK as a potential pilot project.  The Pilot 
Case would connect CO2 sources with CO2 sinks via a transboundary transport network (see 
Figure 1 in the next section). Transboundary transportation of CO2 would necessitate the 
creation of an international statutory framework (between Member States).  This paper explores 
governance and statutory issues as needed at this early stage for the planning, construction, 
commission and operation of a cross-border gateway project for CO2 transport.   
 
This paper is structured as follows.  First, after a brief overview of the Pilot Case (the Rotterdam 
Nucleus), we explore considerations for developing a statutory framework for the Pilot Case.  
Second, we consider project ownership by Member State governments in the Pilot Case, and 
how public-private ownership in CCS projects are used in other countries. Brief reviews of 
several international CCS projects are presented: 1) a CO2 gathering and trunk line transport 
network (Canada); 2) a CCS project in Australia that has a long operations (and hence liability) 
phase (Gorgon); and 3) recent recommendations in the UK as to commercial and ownership 
structures to initiate CCS development.  
 
Next, possible ownership arrangements for the Pilot Case are discussed. Fourth, potential 
partnership arrangements from a legal and policy perspective, between Pilot Case participants, 
being between Member States as well as between private sector and Member States.  The 
relevance of PCIs in partnership arrangements is noted. Considerations for allocation and 
management of risk in the Pilot Case are presented.  Fifth, we present a strategy for exploring 
the legal issues to be discussed with Member States participating in the Pilot Case; establishment 
of a statutory framework; allocation of risk; and government participation and ownership in the 
Pilot Case. Finally, this paper concludes with a summary and highlights areas for future 
research.1   
 
 
2: The Legal Framework for the Pilot Case CO2 Transport Project 
 
2.1: Introduction 
 
This section reviews the status of the CCS legal and policy frameworks in the EU. First it 
however, presents the Pilot Case description. 
 
2.2: The CO2 Transport Pilot Case (Rotterdam Nucleus) – Description 
 
Under the CO2 Transport Pilot Case (Rotterdam Nucleus) development scenario, CO2 sources in 
the Netherlands (Port of Rotterdam) – the ROAD CCS project would be the initial user – would 
be linked to CO2 storage facilities located offshore in the Dutch North Sea.  Transport 
infrastructure would be extended to connect high CO2 hydrocarbon development opportunities 
                                                
1 Financial support for this project from the EU Commission under the H2020 framework programme for research 
and innovation is highly appreciated. 
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of the Fizzy field and P1-FA field in the UK North Sea to storage locations offshore the 
Netherlands (e.g., P18 and P15 storage sites) via a long distance pipeline (see Figure 1). 
 
The development would comprise three pipelines to be delivered simultaneously with a planned 
operation start date between 2022 and 2024: 
 
1. A short distance pipeline (~ 20km), with an onshore connection to Rotterdam CO2 
collection network.  
2. A short distance pipeline (~25km) linking the Maasvlakte Harbour to the P8-A shortage 
platform (the “Rotterdam CO2 Gateway”).   
3. A main spine pipeline of around 130km extending from the Fizzy and P1-FA fields in the 
UK’s Southern North Sea to the P18 storage facility in the Dutch North Sea (the “Dutch 
North Sea Trunkline”). 
 
Figure 1.  Rotterdam Nucleus Pilot Case2 
  
 
2.3: EU Policy and CCS 
 
The EU has a goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% of 1990 levels by 2050.3  
In its 2050 Energy Roadmap, the European Commission identified CCS as a key technology that 
could achieve these targets.4  Broad deployment of CCS to facilitate climate change goals 
requires infrastructure integration and connectivity.  The European Commission has been taking 
steps to deliver such integration through a number of legislative and policy actions. 
 
The key legislation is this regard is the CCS Directive,5 which establishes a framework for CO2 
storage across the EU.  Article 24 of the CCS Directive, entitled “Transboundary Cooperation”, 
requires: “In cases of transboundary transport of CO2, transboundary storage sites or 
transboundary storage complexes, the competent authorities of the Member States concerned 
shall jointly meet the requirements of this Directive and of other relevant Community 
                                                
2 GATEWAY Project’s PCI application dated 15 April 2017. 
3  European Commission, ‘Energy roadmap 2050’ (COM(2011) 885 final of 15 December 2011) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2012_energy_roadmap_2050_en_0.pdf>. 
4  European Commission, ‘Energy roadmap 2050’ (COM(2011) 885 final of 15 December 2011) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2012_energy_roadmap_2050_en_0.pdf>. 
5 Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of 
carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 
2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 (CCS 
Directive). 
Earlham
P01-FA
Q1
P15
cluster
P18
Cluster
Rotterdam
Dutch	North	Sea
Trunkline
Rotterdam
CO2 Gateway
 4 
legislation”.6  However, issues remain in cross-border integration of the CCS value chain (i.e., 
CO2 capture, transport and geological storage).   
 
For instance, while Member States have transposed the CCS Directive7 into national law, 
inconsistencies can be observed among Member State policies and political support for CCS 
infrastructure projects across the EU.  This could hinder CCS transboundary network 
development, impacting the realization of cross-border projects.8   
 
Another essential piece of EU legislation for CCS development is the Trans-European Energy 
Infrastructure Regulation (TEN-E Regulation).9  The TEN-E Regulation provides mechanisms to 
promote connectivity and development of strategic energy infrastructure.  CCS is one of the key 
thematic development areas eligible for classification as Projects of Common Interest (PCI).10  
PCIs are eligible for streamlined approvals and EU funding.  The 2017 call for PCI submissions 
for CO2 transport projects was issued in March 2017, with applications due 15 April 2017.11  
This was the first opportunity for CCS projects to apply for PCI classification.12   
 
CCS as a TEN-E Regulation Priority Thematic Area contemplates a “[c]ross-border carbon 
dioxide network: development of carbon dioxide transport infrastructure between Member States 
and with neighbouring third countries in view of the deployment of carbon dioxide capture and 
storage”.13  (See also Section Error! Reference source not found. below.)  Such networks 
entail “development of carbon dioxide transport infrastructure between Member States and with 
neighbouring third countries in view of the deployment of carbon dioxide capture and storage”.14  
 
2.4: Key Legal Issues: The Three Layers of Law 
 
2.4.1: The Legal Context  
 
While the EU has enacted the CCS Directive, the Directive focuses largely on governance of 
CO2 storage, rather than transboundary CO2 transportation.  Therefore, a challenge for the 
potential Pilot Case is the establishment of a regulatory framework appropriate for the project’s 
transboundary component, and which is suitable to support infrastructure interconnectivity.  
There are several options by which such a statutory regime could be developed. 
 
The discussion here focuses on transportation and connectivity of CO2 sources and sinks from 
the UK to the Netherlands and from Belgium to the Netherlands.  Development of a statutory 
framework to govern the transboundary Pilot Case implicates energy law at the international, 
national and local levels.15  That is, energy law is subject to dynamics that occur within three 
levels of law—international, national and local—in which change at one level influences the 
                                                
6 Directive 2009/31/EC, Article 24. 
7 Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of 
carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 
2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 (CCS 
Directive). 
8  Milieu, ‘Identification of future CO2 infrastructure networks’ (November 2015, Report for the European 
Commission ENER/B1/FV2014-731/SI2.639451). 
9 TEN-E Regulation. 
10 TEN-E Regulation, Annex I. 
11 Statement by Katrien Priens of European Commission (email correspondence issuing call for candidate projects 
of common interest in the area of carbon dioxide transport 1 March 2017). 
12 Ramboll & Ecorys, Report for the European Commission, ‘Support the Selection Process of PCI Candidates in 
the Thematic Area of Cross-Border Carbon Dioxide Networks: Cost-Benefit Analysis Methodology and PCI 
Application Template Final Report (21 February 2017). 
13 TEN-E Regulation, Annex I. 
14 TEN-E Regulation, Annex I. 
15 See GATEWAY Deliverable 3.1. 
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others.16  In energy law analysis, this entails the application of the Theory of Change in Energy 
Law.17  Here, we will consider the relevance and influence of these layers of law for a statutory 
framework to enable the Pilot Case. 
 
It is important to note that, “[u]nlike the electricity and gas sectors, there is no master plan for 
the development of an EU-wide CO2 transport infrastructure network, nor are there imminent 
plans to establish one”.18  Accordingly, statutory requirements for the development of a CO2 
transport network explored here are project-specific and account for the possibility of future 
expansion. 
 
2.4.2: International Law Issues 
 
As noted previously, Article 24 of the CCS Directive mandates the competent authorities of 
Member States to cooperate to jointly meet EU legislative requirements for transboundary 
transport of CO2 for CCS.19  International agreements for transboundary transport of CO2 for the 
Pilot Case would require an agreement between the Netherlands and the UK to achieve the Fizzy 
field extension (future expansion scenarios, such as to Belgium or Germany would also require 
international agreements).  Interstate agreements would need to include several items, with many 
of the important issues highlighted in the sections to follow.  
 
London Protocol 
The Member States participating in the GATEWAY project Pilot Case would need to overcome 
the London Protocol restriction.  This includes the means by which a solution would be 
achieved.  
 
Briefly, Article 6 of the London Protocol prohibits treaty signatories from exporting 
transboundary waste for disposal at sea.20  Where CO2 is considered a waste (e.g., in the case of 
CCS), the London Protocol is a challenge for transboundary CCS projects with offshore CO2 
storage such as the GATEWAY project (as the Member States of the Pilot Case are London 
Protocol parties).   
 
In the absence of ratification of an amendment to the London Protocol, several proposals for 
resolving the prohibition have been explored in the literature.21  One alternative example is 
                                                
16 Raphael J Heffron and Kim Talus, ‘The development of energy law in the 21st century: a paradigm shift?’ (2016) 
9(3) Journal of World Energy Law and Business 189. 
17 Raphael J Heffron and Kim Talus, ‘The development of energy law in the 21st century: a paradigm shift?’ (2016) 
9(3) Journal of World Energy Law and Business 189. 
18 Ramboll & Ecorys, Report for the European Commission, ‘Support the Selection Process of PCI Candidates in 
the Thematic Area of Cross-Border Carbon Dioxide Networks: Cost-Benefit Analysis Methodology and PCI 
Application Template Final Report (21 February 2017) 7. 
19 See EC/2009/31, Preamble 39 and Article 24; Options for how this cooperation could be documented would 
depend on the engagement of the Member States involved, and which was explored in other Work Package 3 
Deliverables. 
20 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution By Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
1972 (“London Protocol”), Article 6.  
21  IMO, ‘Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter’ 
<www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Pages/default.aspx>; International Maritime Organisation (IMO), 
‘Carbon Capture and Sequestration’ (2016), 
<www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/EmergingIssues/CCS/Pages/default.aspx>; Justine Garrett and 
John McCoy, 'Carbon capture and storage and the London Protocol: Recent Efforts to Enable Transboundary CO2 
Transfer' (2013) 37 Energy Procedia 7747; Chiara Armeni, ‘Legal Developments for Carbon Capture and Storage 
under International and Regional Marine Legislation’ in Ian Havercroft, Richard Macrory and Richard B Stewart 
(eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues (Hart Publishing 2011) 145. 
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creation of bilateral treaties between Member States (which could pose political risk at an 
international level).22  
 
It has been estimated widespread deployment of CCS in the EU will not occur until at least 
2030, in which commercial-scale deployment would be key.23  This suggests sufficient time for 
the London Protocol prohibition to be addressed broadly in the EU.  However, the timeframe for 
developing the GATEWAY project Pilot Case would require participating Member States to 
seek a resolution to this as a matter of priority. 
 
CCS Directive and Third Party Access 
Chapter 5 of the CCS Directive, entitled ‘Third-Party Access’ seeks to address competition 
concerns in the CCS sector.24  Article 21 sets out requirements for third party access to transport 
and storage facilities, requiring access to be provided in a “transparent and non-discriminatory 
manner”. 25  Article 22 demands Member States have dispute settlement arrangements for cross-
border infrastructure access disputes, an issue which must be contemplated in any transnational 
legislation governing the Pilot Case (see Table 1).   
 
Table 1.  CCS Article 22  
Third-Party Access. 26 
 
“[T]the Member State having jurisdiction over the transport network or storage site to which access has 
been refused shall be applied.  Where, in cross-border disputes, more than one Member State covers the 
transport network or storage site concerned, the Member States concerned shall consult with a view to 
ensuring that this Directive is applied consistently”. 
 
 
Transboundary Cooperation – Appropriate Models 
As mentioned previously, the EU’s CCS Directive focuses largely on CO2 storage.  The CCS 
Directive requires Member States’ competent authorities to “jointly meet the requirements of 
this Directive and of other relevant Community legislation”.27  This implies joint responsibility 
should be shared between Member States participating in the CCS project.28   
 
However, as national laws that govern liability for CO2 leakage are not standardized, creation of 
a transboundary statutory regime for CCS would need to be established between Member 
States.29   
  
The North Sea Basin Task Force (NSBTF) is a possible platform in which Pilot Case Member 
States could establish the regional terms for transboundary CCS infrastructure.  The benefits of 
                                                
22 IEA, ‘Carbon Capture and Storage and the London Protocol: Options for Enabling Transboundary CO2 Transfer’ 
(Working Paper) (Paris: OECD/ IEA 2011) 
<www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/CCS_London_Protocol.pdf>; Rudra V Kapila, 
‘Transboundary Chains for CO2 Enhanced Oil Recovery: Legal Contexts for CO2 Injection in the North Sea’, 
Scottish Carbon Capture and Storage Association (31 January 2013) 
<www.sccs.org.uk/images/expertise/misc/SCCS-CO2-EOR-JIP-Transboundary.pdf> accessed 1 March 2017. 
23  European Commission, ‘Energy roadmap 2050’ (COM(2011) 885 final of 15 December 2011) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2012_energy_roadmap_2050_en_0.pdf>. 
24 Hans Vedder, ‘EC Competition Law and the Organisation of CCS’ in Martha M. Roggenkamp & Edwin 
Woerdman, Legal Design of Carbon Capture and Storage: Developments in the Netherlands from an International 
and EU Perspective (Intersentia 2009). 
25 EC/2009/31 Article 21.  
26 EC/2009/31 Article 22(2).  
27 CCS Directive, Article 24. 
28 Rudra V Kapila, ‘Transboundary Chains for CO2 Enhanced Oil Recovery: Legal Contexts for CO2 Injection in the 
North Sea’, Scottish Carbon Capture and Storage Association (31 January 2013) 
<www.sccs.org.uk/images/expertise/misc/SCCS-CO2-EOR-JIP-Transboundary.pdf> accessed 1 March 2017. 
29 Ibid. Rudra V Kapila (2013).  
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establishing a CCS regulatory framework to facilitate transboundary CCS development in the 
North Sea has been acknowledged elsewhere, with the NSBTF being the logical platform under 
which to undertake this work.30  It is noted NSBTF includes Member States who would be 
participating in the Pilot Case, and so engagement with this organization to support delivery of 
the Pilot Case project would be a reasonable approach.  Moreover, the NSBTF could be of 
particular relevance for creating a regional regulatory framework for CCS in the North Sea 
beyond the Pilot Case.  
 
Furthermore, given the extensive experience of natural gas networks regulation in the EU and 
the expansion of infrastructure connectivity to establish an internal energy market (particularly 
under the Third Energy Package), the EU’s approach to natural gas regulation is perhaps a more 
relevant reference point for the Pilot Case.  The Third Energy Package addressed issues such as 
ownership unbundling in natural gas and electricity networks.31  It also established the Agency 
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to coordinate energy regulators across the EU 
to enable cross-border energy transactions. 32  (It is noted ACER is involved in the regulation of 
gas and electricity PCIs in the TEN-E regulations.)   
 
As CCS and CO2 transport interconnectivity evolve, and the role of ACER continues to expand 
such as can be found in the recent recast of the ACER regulation,33 it would seem ACER would 
be the logical platform by which to enable regulatory consistency for CO2 transport in the EU.  
The results of the 2017 PCI application round for CCS could influence the timing for this 
intervention.  For example, several CCS projects could be developed, resulting in a pan-EU CO2 
transport network in the near term.  This would suggest a uniform regulatory approach could be 
more efficient than a regional one (e.g., NSBTF); consider, for example the European 
Commission’s observations in the Explanatory Memorandum to the recent recast of the ACER 
regulation, which noted the difficulties presented by lack of Member State coordination and 
consistency in regulation regionally.34  Yet, as this option is not in effect for CCS today, the 
present analysis focuses on treaty-level considerations. 
 
Transboundary Cooperation for the GATEWAY Pilot Case 
Member States participating in CCS projects could incorporate learnings gained in delivering 
transboundary natural gas projects into any agreements established between the nations.  This 
would be in absence of the European Commission enacting regulation/guidance of CCS beyond 
that currently provided under the CCS Directive which requires Member States to undertake 
‘transboundary cooperation’ under Article 24.  Regulatory considerations such as standard 
setting are explored further in section 0 below. 
                                                
30 See, e.g., Det Norske Veritas, ‘Updated Gap Analysis – Legal, Regulatory and Economical Issues related to 
Carbon Capture and Storage: Report for the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy – Norway, as input to the North Sea 
Basin Task Force, Phase II’ (DNV Report no 2008 - -185) (2008) 
<www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/oed/pdf_filer/rapporter/det_norske_veritas_gap-analyse.pdf> accessed 1 
March 2017; Element Energy, ‘One North Sea’ (2010, Report for The Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy and The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office) <www.npd.no/en/publications/reports/one-north-sea/6-
legal-and-regulatory-issues/>. 
31  European Commission, ‘Market legislation’ <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-
consumers/market-legislation > accessed 15 March 2017; see also ‘Samuel R. Schubert, Johannes Pollak & Maren 
Kreutler, Energy Policy of the European Union (Palgrave 2016) 152 – 157. 
32  European Commission, ‘Market legislation’ <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-
consumers/market-legislation > accessed 15 March 2017; see also ‘Samuel R. Schubert, Johannes Pollak & Maren 
Kreutler, Energy Policy of the European Union (Palgrave 2016) 152 – 157. 
33 See e.g., European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (recast)’ COM(2016) 863 final/2 
(30 November 2017).   
34 Explanatory Memorandum accompanying European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(recast)’ COM(2016) 863 final/2 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0863R%2801%29 (23 February 2017). 
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As the Pilot Case presents a staged development scenario with the opportunity for future 
expansion opportunities, a commercial and political decision would need to be made as to the 
optimal negotiation framework for the international agreement.  For example, a bilateral 
agreement could be established between the UK and the Netherlands with a separate agreement 
between the Netherlands and Belgium.  Commercial and legal arrangements should consider 
expansion opportunities, such as extending to Germany or Norway. 
 
It is reasonable to question whether a regional transboundary CCS framework should be 
established to which future CO2 exporters are a party, or whether the initial agreement between 
the UK and the Netherlands serves as the reference case for future international agreements.  
The advantage of a sectoral framework is it ensures homogeneity of rights and duties.  The 
disadvantage of this approach is the time required for negotiations of multiple parties, including 
some for whom CCS is not a national priority (e.g., Germany),35 which could result in delays. 
 
Conversely, the advantage of multiple, separate agreements between CO2 source countries and 
CO2 sink nations is the time-savings on the front end.  Agreeing one or two international, 
bilateral agreements between sovereigns is simpler than a multinational framework.  However, 
the significant downside of this approach is the risk of a complex, and possibly incongruent, 
framework being developed over time.  One way to overcome this risk would be to include back 
to back obligations in the initial bilateral transit pipeline agreement (e.g., between the UK and 
the Netherlands), which would be incorporated in future agreements with other nations, 
including for transit pipelines (i.e., those originating in one nation, crossing a second nation in 
order to arrive at its destination in another nation).36   
 
Multilateral and Bilateral Coordination – Project Development 
Multilateral project development involving several nations would also require coordination.  In 
addition, initiation of a project coordinator at the international level would facilitate a consistent 
approach to project delivery and operation of transboundary CO2 transport.  (This is similar to 
the issues facing actors in value chain integration, which is discussed in section Error! 
Reference source not found. below.)   
 
As mentioned previously in section two above, the EU has established a PCI framework to 
support development of energy infrastructure connectivity.  CCS is one area eligible for PCI 
treatment.  The first call for transboundary CCS PCI applications was issued in February 2017, 
with applications due 15 April 2017.37  As set out in the TEN-E Regulation, proposed CO2 
transport projects seeking PCI classification “shall be presented as part of a plan, developed by 
at least two Member States”.38   
 
The PCI application for CO2 transport networks requires the participation of at least two 
Member States, however, the initial stage of the PCI project may be restricted to one country in 
which future transboundary transport network expansion is contemplated.  This was noted in the 
recent PCI application report that accompanied the call for proposals for CCS PCI projects, 
which is set out in Table 2. 
                                                
35 See Deliverable 3.1, which explored the CCS policies of the various countries contemplated in the Pilot Case 
expansion scenarios.   
36 Energy Charter Secretariat, Intergovernmental Agreements and Host Government Agreements on Oil and Gas 
Pipelines – A Comparison (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2015). 
37 See Ramboll & Ecorys, Report for the European Commission, ‘Support the Selection Process of PCI Candidates 
in the Thematic Area of Cross-Border Carbon Dioxide Networks: Cost-Benefit Analysis Methodology and PCI 
Application Template Final Report (21 February 2017); Katrien Priens of European Commission (email 
correspondence issuing call for candidate projects of common interest in the area of carbon dioxide transport 1 
March 2017).  
38 TEN-E Regulation, Annex III.2. 
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Accordingly, the PCI application process itself encourages bilateral cooperation through the 
development of a transboundary CO2 transport plan between at least two Member States.  The 
plan to be developed could serve as the basis for determining the statutory framework for the 
GATEWAY project going forward.   
 
Table 2. PCI Application – Explanatory Note Regarding TEN-E Regulation 
European Commission’s Explanation of the TEN-E Regulation’s Requirement fora Joint Plan and the PCI 
Application 
 
“Annex III.2 of the TEN-E Regulation defines the rules for the creation of PCI lists, including that these should be 
devised by Member States and project promoters….The plan that needs to be developed by the two Member States 
does not form part of the PCI application template; however it is something without which the application cannot 
progress” 39  
 
 
“This confirms that at least two countries must be involved in developing a plan, regardless of whether the proposed 
PCI physically crosses a border; and that applications must be able to demonstrate a significant cross-border impact 
for their proposed infrastructure.  
 
Parameters for determining ‘significant cross-border impact’ are not outlined in the legislation for CO2 projects, 
contrary to other energy infrastructure priority corridors where quantitative minimum thresholds are set. The early 
stage of market and planning development in the CO2 sector makes it difficult to set an equivalent threshold. The 
significance of the impact can be understood in broader terms, such as unlocking significant storage capacity, or 
laying the grounds for significant future development of cross-border networks. As such, single-country projects 
may still be eligible for PCI status, as long as they are relevant to more than one country and can demonstrate that 
cross-border connections, or where collaboration in the context of CO2 transport is planned at a later stage….”40  
 
 
2.4.3: National Legal Issues 
 
Since the CCS Directive emphasises CO2 storage, the national law of the relevant Member 
States of the Pilot Case would be the predominant legal regime for CO2 transport 
infrastructure.41  This could increase project complexity and inconsistencies among the laws of 
the participating Member States of the Pilot Case could arise.  Accordingly, establishing a 
standardized, workable legal regime that encourages investment and stable operations will be 
important.  Ideally, these consistent requirements would be applied across the project life cycle, 
from construction to decommissioning.   
 
As noted previously, CCS is one of the thematic areas under the TEN-E Regulation in which the 
aim is to establish interconnectivity of European energy infrastructure.  To achieve this 
objective, the legal regime for the Pilot Case should account for future expansion of the CO2 
transport network beyond the initial Member States of the Pilot Case.  This suggests that any 
regulation of CO2 transport at the national level would require a coordinated approach to enable 
consistencies and a legal regime that is future proof.  This idea can be observed in Preamble 43 
of the TEN-E Regulation, which acknowledged that Union-level action could better realise an 
interconnected network than could be achieved at Member State level.42   
                                                
39 Ramboll & Ecorys, Report for the European Commission, ‘Support the Selection Process of PCI Candidates in 
the Thematic Area of Cross-Border Carbon Dioxide Networks: Cost-Benefit Analysis Methodology and PCI 
Application Template Final Report (21 February 2017) 4 – 5.  
40 Ramboll & Ecorys, Report for the European Commission, ‘Support the Selection Process of PCI Candidates in 
the Thematic Area of Cross-Border Carbon Dioxide Networks: Cost-Benefit Analysis Methodology and PCI 
Application Template Final Report (21 February 2017) 8 (emphasis in the original source). 
41 Martha M Roggenkamp & Edwin Woerdman, ‘Looking Beyond the Legal Uncertainties of CCS’ in Martha M. 
Roggenkamp & Edwin Woerdman (eds), Legal Design of Carbon Capture and Storage: Developments in the 
Netherlands from an International and EU Perspective (Intersentia 2009). 
42 TEN-E Regulation, Preamble 43. 
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A reasonable extension of this logic is that a Union-level regulatory framework for CO2 
transport should also be developed to progress the aims of the TEN-E regulation.  The European 
Commission employed a similar approach for interconnectivity of electricity and gas networks 
through the Third Energy Package, in which it created, inter alia, a European Network for 
Transmission System Operators (ENTSO).43  The mandate of ENTSO-E (for electricity) and 
ENTSO-G (for gas) includes transboundary cooperation for transmission system operators to 
enable improved cross-border access of energy networks, as well as creation of standardized 
legal framework for commercial and technical codes.44 
 
The Member States participating in the transboundary CCS project could agree the terms of 
international regulation of the pipeline that crosses their State boundaries.  For example, the 
Member States could agree the law of the State with the most stringent environmental 
regulations for CO2 pipelines applies, or that the regulatory authority of one Member State will 
have oversight of the transboundary CO2 infrastructure.45  The uncertainties and complexities of 
coordinating potentially inconsistent national laws could be enhanced as CO2 transport networks 
evolve toward broad distribution.  This notion further supports the suggestion that an ENTSO-
type coordination would be a useful model for future management of CO2 transport.  
 
Government incentives and funding, including the allocation of risks and liabilities would also 
be a relevant consideration for the statutory framework of the Pilot Case.  This idea is presented 
further in section Error! Reference source not found. below.  However, it is noted here that the 
common view is government should accept liability in order to encourage private sector 
participation in the development of CCS.   
 
2.4.4: Local Legal Issues 
 
The final layer law and policy of relevance for transboundary CCS development of the Pilot 
Case is the local level.  As has been observed in other GATEWAY project deliverables and in 
the PCI application, the pipeline routes for the Pilot Case would largely be based in existing 
industrial areas and along an existing pipeline corridor.  Therefore, minimal negative public 
perception issues are expected.   
 
However, the longest portion of the pipeline route will be based in the Netherlands.  Given 
onshore CCS development has had a negative history in the Netherlands (i.e., cancellation of 
Barendrecht CCS demonstration project, which had onshore storage following public objection), 
public perception of the Pilot Case could influence project success. In addition, public 
perception at the local level could influence international-level discussions, indeed, public 
                                                
43 See e.g., European Commission, ‘Questions and Answers on the third legislative package for an internal EU gas 
and electricity market’ (2 March 2011) < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-125_en.htm?locale=en> 
accessed 6 March 2017; Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 
2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1775/2005; Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1228/2003. 
44 See e.g., European Commission, ‘Questions and Answers on the third legislative package for an internal EU gas 
and electricity market’ (2 March 2011) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-125_en.htm?locale=en> 
accessed 6 March 2017; Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 
2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1775/2005; Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1228/2003.  
45 Rudra V Kapila, ‘Transboundary Chains for CO2 Enhanced Oil Recovery: Legal Contexts for CO2 Injection in the 
North Sea’, Scottish Carbon Capture and Storage Association (31 January 2013) 
<www.sccs.org.uk/images/expertise/misc/SCCS-CO2-EOR-JIP-Transboundary.pdf> accessed 1 March 2017. 
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engagement by Member State competent authorities may be necessary to achieve successful 
international cooperation. 
 
2.5: Conclusion  
 
A statutory framework must be established to support the transboundary CO2 transport for the 
Pilot Case, and which addresses issues presented at the international, national and local levels of 
law.  There are a number of mechanisms to achieve this, and the approach will be influenced by 
the participating Member States’ agreed strategy.  Regulation could be project-specific, 
regionally based or even pan-EU.  For example, the role of CCS is contemplated in UK energy 
policy, in which infrastructure connectivity is key.  This will have relevance for the Pilot Case, 
which proposes to connect the UK’s Fizzy field to storage sites offshore the Netherlands.   
 
Further and in need of noting is that an environmental impact assessment (EIA) will have to be 
conducted for the project to receive final approval.  Although, one may perceive passing through 
the EIA process should be relatively straightforward for parts of the proposed Pilot Case (as in 
the offshore component) some of the public perception concerns that may arise onshore could be 
significant. Further, and of more importance of the new EIA regime that came into effect in the 
EU from 16 May 2017. There are a number of major changes (listed below) and these will be in 
need of investigation by a project promoter of the Pilot Case who proceeds to the EIA process:  
 
• There is now mandatory post-EIA monitoring; 
• Independent EIA experts need to be involved in the process; 
• Detailed consideration of alternatives (for example in light of below); and 
• A number of additional environmental issues have been added, and these include the 
need for an investigation into the impact of climate change and impact upon public 
health. 
 
 
3: International Ownership and Risk Assessment for a CO2 Transport Project 
 
3.1: Introduction 
 
One of the aims of this paper is to assess candidate owners and to secure the required level of 
authority within the nations involved.  This requires an understanding of the relationship 
between liability transfer across the CCS value chain and value chain ownership.  
 
The Pilot project would be an international, full value chain CCS project that links multiple CO2 
sources with sinks through a transboundary CO2 transportation network.  This section explores 
value chain ownership and risk allocation of CCS in countries internationally, which is 
informative to the Pilot Case. Brief reviews of several projects are presented:  1) a CO2 gathering 
and trunk line transport network (Canada); 2) a CCS project in Australia that has a long 
operations (and hence liability) phase (Gorgon); and 3) recent recommendations in the UK as to 
commercial and ownership structures to initiate CCS development.     
 
3.2: Canada - Alberta Carbon Trunk Line Project 
 
The Alberta Carbon Trunk Line (ACTL) project in Canada is a CO2 transport ‘backbone’ project 
intended to collect CO2 emissions from industrial clusters, where CO2 is transported 240 
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kilometers via pipeline to the storage site.46  This connection of CO2 clusters with storage by 
way of long distance pipeline is similar to the intended development of the Pilot project.   
 
The ACTL is solely a domestic Canadian project.  The pipeline is located within the borders of 
the province of Alberta, and therefore is regulated at the provincial level.47  The project is also 
operated by the private sector, however, funding for the pipeline is provided by both the 
provincial (Alberta) and Canadian governments.48  The initial CO2 sources will be an Agrium 
fertilizer plant and a bitumen refinery jointly owned by Northwest Upgrading Inc. and Canadian 
Natural Upgrading Limited.49  The pipeline and storage are operated by Enhance Energy.50  
 
The Alberta government accepts broad long term liability for CO2 storage (after a closure 
certificate is issued, following the meeting of certain requirements by the storage operator).51  
This can be found in legislation, which is presented in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Carbon Capture and Storage Statutes Amendment Act, 2010 (Alberta) 
Section 121(1) 
 
(1) On the Minister issuing a closure certificate to a lessee in respect of an agreement under this Part, the Crown  
(a) becomes the owner of the captured carbon dioxide injected pursuant to the agreement,  
(b) assumes all obligations of the lessee 
(i) as owner and licensee under the Oil and Gas Conservation Act of the wells and facilities covered by 
that agreement,  
(ii) as the person responsible for the injected captured carbon dioxide under the Environmental 
Protection and Enhancement Act,  
(iii) as the operator under Part 6 of the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act in respect of 
the land within the location of the agreement used by the lessee in relation to the injection of 
captured carbon dioxide, and  
(iv) under the Surface Rights Act, and  
(c) releases the lessee from any obligations under section 56(2)(a) with respect to the wells within the 
location of the agreement used by the lessee in relation to the injection of captured carbon dioxide.52 
 
 
In addition, the Alberta government provides a post-handover indemnity to the storage 
operator.53  The transfer of ownership to the government reflects a shared ownership model 
between the private and public sectors.    
 
                                                
46  Enhance Energy, ‘The Alberta Carbon Trunk Line Project Fact Sheet’ 
<www.enhanceenergy.com/pdf/ACTL/actl_fact_sheet.pdf> accessed 16 February 2017. 
47  Global CCS Institute, ‘Canadian laws regulating CO2 transport for storage’ 
<https://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/publications/legislation-relating-co2-transport-storage/canadian-laws-
regulating-co2-transport-storage>. 
48 Government of Canada, Natural Resources of Canada, ‘Alberta Carbon Trunk Line (ACTL)’ (21 January 2016) 
<http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/publications/16233> accessed 16 February 2016. 
49 Global CCS Institute, ‘Alberta Carbon Trunk Line ("ACTL") with Agrium CO2 Stream’ (15 September 2016) 
<www.globalccsinstitute.com/projects/alberta-carbon-trunk-line-actl-agrium-co2-stream> accessed 15 February 
2017; Global CCS Institute, ‘Alberta Carbon Trunk Line ("ACTL") with North West Sturgeon Refinery CO2 
Stream’(15 September 2016) <www.globalccsinstitute.com/projects/alberta-carbon-trunk-line-actl-north-west-
sturgeon-refinery-co2-stream> accessed 15 February 2017. 
50 Global CCS Institute, ‘Alberta Carbon Trunk Line ("ACTL") with Agrium CO2 Stream’ (15 September 2016) 
<www.globalccsinstitute.com/projects/alberta-carbon-trunk-line-actl-agrium-co2-stream> accessed 15 February 
2017; Global CCS Institute, ‘Alberta Carbon Trunk Line ("ACTL") with North West Sturgeon Refinery CO2 
Stream’(15 September 2016) <www.globalccsinstitute.com/projects/alberta-carbon-trunk-line-actl-north-west-
sturgeon-refinery-co2-stream> accessed 15 February 2017. 
51 Mike Fernandez and others, ‘Liability for sequestered CO2: the path forward for Alberta’ (2013) 37 Energy 
Procedia 7709. 
52 Carbon Capture and Storage Statutes Amendment Act, 2010 (Alberta) section 121(1). 
53 Carbon Capture and Storage Statutes Amendment Act, 2010 (Alberta) section 121(2). 
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Alberta’s CCS legislation requires storage operators to pay into a stewardship fund at a fee per 
tonne of CO2 sequestered.  The fund may be used by the government for the purpose of 
monitoring, environmental obligations and various activities for long-term storage 
management.54  This is another means of risk management with the operations-phase project 
owners/operators providing funding, which could be used by the government as the future owner 
of the project (post-operations).  
 
3.3: Australia - Gorgon 
 
One large commercial scale CCS project is under development in Australia—the Gorgon 
project, located on the site of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility in Western Australia.  While 
the Gorgon project is simpler than the Pilot project in that it is a standalone remote project 
(rather than a CO2 transport network), the project liability structure, with risk sharing between 
government and private parties, is notable.   
 
The Gorgon project is governed by an agreement between the Government of Western Australia 
and the unincorporated joint venture of the Gorgon LNG project.55  The project agreement, 
which is ascribed in legislation, requires CCS as part of the LNG project.56   
 
The CCS operator has a long liability period (approximately 40 years), spanning the operation of 
the LNG project,57 and liability that further extends to 15 years post-CO2 injection operations.  
And similar to other jurisdictions, following the monitoring period and meeting certain 
conditions, long term liability for CO2 storage is transferred to the government, in which the 
government indemnifies the CCS operator.    
 
3.4: The United Kingdom 
 
Insights from CCS activities in the UK are also instructive for ownership structures in the Pilot 
project.  The UK government has made a couple of significant, but unsuccessful, attempts to 
deploy CCS in the UK.  Most recently, in 2015, the UK government cancelled the CCS 
competition, which was a dual FEED competition to deliver full value chain CCS.  The program 
was cancelled at a late stage, shortly before the successful bidder was to be announced, at a cost 
of £100 million to the UK government.  While the program did not deliver an operational CCS 
facility, learnings were nonetheless gleaned from the commercialization program, which 
included risk allocation across the value chain as well as between public and private actors.   
 
The two bidders in the UK competition had different commercial approaches for project 
delivery.  One bidder (Shell) proposed one operator across the value chain (capture, transport 
and storage).  The other bidder (Capture Power Limited) was a consortium that sought to 
establish different owners across the CCS value chain.   
 
With regard to risk allocation across the CCS value chain, the NAO, in its review of the 
cancellation of UK CCS Competition, observed that the latter model faced a challenge in 
                                                
54 Carbon Capture and Storage Statutes Amendment Act, 2010 (Alberta) section 122; Mike Fernandez and others, 
‘Liability for sequestered CO2: the path forward for Alberta’ (2013) 37 Energy Procedia 7709. 
55 Barrow Island Act 2003 (Western Australia); Gorgon Gas Processing and Infrastructure Project Agreement, 
Barrow Island Act 2003 (Western Australia) Schedule I. 
56 Barrow Island Act 2003 (Western Australia); Gorgon Gas Processing and Infrastructure Project Agreement, 
Barrow Island Act 2003 (Western Australia) Schedule I. 
57 U.S. Department of Energy, ‘International Carbon Capture and Storage Projects Overcoming Legal Barriers’ 
(DOE/NETL – 2006/1236) (23 June 2006) citing Personal communication with John Torkington, 
Greenhouse/Project Approvals Manager, Gorgon Development, Chevron Australia, June 19, 2006 
<http://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/default/files/publications/159693/International-carbon-capture-storage-
projects-overcoming-legal-barriers.pdf>. 
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“allocat[ing] risks between the parties covering the different elements of the CCS chain in a way 
that would enable it to secure external investment”58; the Capture Power consortium also 
struggled to find an operator for CO2 storage. On the other hand, Shell’s model, in which there 
was one operator, was a simpler structure that did not have the investment challenges.  However, 
the location of the Shell CCS project was viewed as challenging for future expansion of CCS.59   
 
Management of value chain risk in infrastructure development is critical in full chain CCS.  
Ensuring funding across the value chain is critical, and managing this risk is particularly 
important where multiple operators are involved in the project.  This point was noted in a May 
2016 report to the UK Committee on Climate Change (see Table 4 below).  
 
Table 3.  Report to UK Committee on Climate Change. 
How Funding is Allocated to the Three Elements of the CCS Chain 
 
“Funding...can be provided either through a single revenue stream that rewards operation of all three elements (full 
chain funding), or via two or three revenue streams that reward operation of only part of the chain (part chain 
funding). Full chain funding appears attractive as it ensures that payments will only be made if carbon is both 
captured and stored.  Part chain funding has the potential for “white elephant” developments, for example, if a 
transport and storage network is built and not utilised.   
 
One of the lessons to come out of the UK CCS competition is the difficulty of financing on the basis of full chain 
funding. Carbon capture and carbon transport and storage are quite different businesses, requiring different 
expertise and risks. Financing each element with full chain funding adds significant complexity to business 
planning, and the pricing in of risk for all parts of the chain into the financing for each element. A single developer, 
owning all parts of the chain, and financed primarily with equity funds and sufficient contingency funding, would 
be best placed to absorb the risk of failure of one part of the chain on another. This arrangement was present for one 
of the competition projects, but was nonetheless still insufficient to reach agreement on funding...  
 
Separating funding for capture from the funding for transport and storage, and absorbing some or all cross-chain 
risk (such as by making funding for each asset dependent only on the performance of that asset), will reduce 
financing and support costs, lower the barriers for entrants in each sector, and reduce the complexity and timescales 
of project development. It is less clear whether there is a benefit to separating funding and removing cross-chain 
risk between transport and storage, which are more closely related than is capture. We consider either choice 
possible, likely dependent on the business model chosen to deliver CCS, and it may be that different solutions are 
appropriate for the short and long term.”60 
 
 
The UK observation was that separation of ownership (and funding) of the transport and storage 
stages of the value chain from the capture stage provides a simplicity in commercial structuring.  
This type of arrangement can also be observed in the ownership structures of other CCS projects 
presented in this chapter.  However, the Pilot project will not have the benefit of this ownership 
simplicity, as different operators will span the value chain stages.  While the commercial 
structures for the Pilot Case are beyond the scope of this paper, they have been noted here as 
they are relevant for discussions of partnership arrangements and statutory risk sharing between 
government and private parties.   
 
                                                
58 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Department for Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy, ‘Carbon capture and storage: the second competition for government support’ (20 January 2017) 
9 <www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Carbon-Capture-and-Storage-the-second-competition-for-
government-support.pdf>. 
59 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Department for Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy, ‘Carbon capture and storage: the second competition for government support’ (20 January 2017) 
9 <www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Carbon-Capture-and-Storage-the-second-competition-for-
government-support.pdf>. 
60 Poyry, ‘A Strategic Approach for Developing CCS in the UK: A report to The Committee on Climate Change’ 
(May 2016) (Report 2016/346)7 – 8 <www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Poyry_-
_A_Strategic_Approach_For_Developing_CCS_in_the_UK.pdf>. 
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Lord Oxburgh Model – UK 
Following cancellation of the UK CCS Competition in 2015, a UK Parliamentary Advisory 
Group on CCS issued a report to recommend progress for CCS in the UK (referred to in this 
paper as the Lord Oxburgh Report).61  Recommendations included an ownership and public-
private risk sharing model to initiate CCS development in the UK.  The ownership model of the 
Report is considered here, whereas the risk sharing aspects of the proposal are considered in the 
next section. 
 
The Lord Oxburgh Report proposed the government should establish three government owned 
companies: 
 
1. A CCS Delivery Company (CCSDC), which is a parent company and acts as a 
coordinator for the capture, transport and storage activities of the CCS value chain.  The 
CCSDC comprises two subsidiaries—CCS PowerCo (PowerCo) and CCS Transport and 
Storage Company (T&SCo). 
2. PowerCo, would be the power company that supplies CO2 under a long term contract, 
thereby ensuring a supply of CO2 to support the CCS project. 
3. T&SCo, would own and operate the transport and storage facilities of the value chain. 
 
The subsidiary companies could be privatized later.  In addition, the T&SCo could be further 
separated (into transport and storage) and privatized.  As such, “[s]tate ownership and financing 
is to be temporary”.62  The Parliamentary Advisory Group acknowledged that government 
ownership for large infrastructure projects is not atypical (with analogies being made to the 
Olympics and Crossrail projects and the role of state-owned businesses in the electricity 
sector).63    
 
The value chain ownership proposal of the Lord Oxburgh report is presented in Figure 2 below.  
 
Figure 2: Lord Oxburgh Report Ownership Model64 
 
 
 
Under the Pilot Case project, CO2 supply, transport and storage are owned and operated by 
separate entities/operators.  For example, P18, which is a CO2 storage site in the Netherlands, is 
                                                
61 Lord Oxburgh, ‘Lowest Cost Decarbonisation for the UK: The Critical Role of CCS’ (2016) (Report to the 
Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy from the Parliamentary Advisory Group on Carbon 
Capture and Storage). 
62 Lord Oxburgh, ‘Lowest Cost Decarbonisation for the UK: The Critical Role of CCS’ (2016) (Report to the 
Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy from the Parliamentary Advisory Group on Carbon 
Capture and Storage) 30. 
63 Lord Oxburgh, ‘Lowest Cost Decarbonisation for the UK: The Critical Role of CCS’ (2016) (Report to the 
Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy from the Parliamentary Advisory Group on Carbon 
Capture and Storage). 
64 Constructed by the Authors (March 2017). 
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operated by TAQA, yet TAQA would not be the CO2 transport operator.  A major challenge for 
the GATEWAY project will be to identify a suitable transport operator and determine allocation 
of risks across the value chain.  This will require the involvement of the participating Member 
States in the Pilot Case.  As stated earlier, the identification of a transport operator is anticipated 
to occur during the April 2019 to April 2021 timeframe. 
 
Vertically integrated ownership structures (in which one party owns all or most of the value 
chain) bypass the challenge of transferring risks and liabilities to different operators at each 
stage of the value chain  (e.g., leakage liability, failure of CO2 delivery).  This ownership 
structure is observed in the ACTL, Gorgon and was proposed for the initial phase of project 
development in the Lord Oxburgh model.  This model was also found in the Peterhead proposal 
of the UK CCS Competition, in which Shell owned the entire CO2 value chain.   
 
Yet, even where the CCS value chain is owned by one (or mostly by one) operator, government 
involvement is still found.  That involvement includes financial incentives or support, or 
ownership of risk (e.g., transfer of post-operation ownership).  Thus, allocation of CCS value 
chain ownership could comprise: 1) government and private parties (either concurrently or 
sequentially); 2) private parties only; 3) or government only.   
 
As was acknowledged in the Lord Oxburgh Report, government will have to accept risk in order 
to initiate widespread, commercial deployment of CCS.  While the government could own the 
CCS value chain initially, ownership could be transferred at a later date to the private sector, as 
CCS evolves and risk is reduced.  This reveals a shared ownership model for CCS – providing 
sequential ownership between government and the private sector. In addition, the UK has 
transcribed the CCS Directive into national law, in which certain liabilities are transferred to the 
government post-closure of the project. 
 
 
4: Project Partners, Risk & the Law 
 
4.1: Introduction 
 
The third aim of this paper is to suggest potential partnership arrangements with national 
authorities from a legal and policy perspective.  This section explores partnership arrangements 
within the context of PCI classification as well as risk allocation across the value chain.  
Analogies are drawn from other energy sectors.   
 
4.2: PCIs and Project Partners 
 
Two development issues identified by the Pilot project are pertinent to the present discussion of 
plausible partnership arrangements from the view of law and policy:65 1) Obtaining Member 
State support is an essential component of the project; and 2) Establishing regulatory and 
liability agreements.  In other words, creating full value chain CCS requires risk allocation to be 
approached from two partnership perspectives.   
 
First, is the establishment of partnerships between 1) the project participants and the Member 
States; and 2) among the Member States participating in the project.  This includes creating a 
standardized regulatory approach for the transboundary aspects of the project (i.e., CO2 
transport), as well as managing risk across the CCS value chain.   
 
                                                
65 Tom Mikunda & Filip Neele, TNO, ‘Projects of Common Interest and the Rotterdam Nucleus Business Case’ 
Presentation at GATEWAY Stakeholder Meeting in London, UK (27 February 2017).  
 17 
It is notable that for PCI eligibility, the project need not cross Member State borders, but rather it 
must have a “significant cross-border impact”. 66   As explained in the Final Report that 
accompanied the call for proposals for CCS PCI applications:  [A]t least two countries must be 
involved in developing a plan, regardless of whether the proposed PCI physically crosses a 
border; and that applications must be able to demonstrate a significant cross-border impact for 
their proposed infrastructure”.67  From a partnership perspective, the Project Promoter for the 
development of the Pilot Case should seek the support of the Member States participating in the 
CCS project.  This point will be considered again later in this section. 
 
Second, establishing partnerships between public (government) and private actors through the 
allocation of risk and provision of incentives such that infrastructure investment is attracted and 
retained (risk into the value chain).  Risk allocation in project partnerships will be explored more 
fully in the following sections. 
 
4.3: Risk Allocation Between Government and Project Participants 
 
Allocation of risk between public and private actors is related to the ownership model of the 
project, which was explored in section 2 and 3 above, particularly where government has 
ownership of all or part of the CCS value chain.  Recent reviews, activities, and 
recommendations from the UK are informative of the rationale for allocation of risk between the 
private and public sectors.  The following discussion has relevance beyond CCS projects subject 
to PCI treatment, as not all full value chain CCS projects will be developed as PCIs.  
 
Risk allocation was one issue considered by the NAO in its review of the UK CCS competition 
that was cancelled in 2015 (see Table 5 below):  
 
Table 5:  Risk Allocation in CCS Competition. 
NAO’s View68 
 
“Government taking a greater share of the risk could reduce delivery costs but would expose taxpayers to losses in 
the event of risks materialising.  Investors’ required return reflects the level of risk they are exposed to; if the 
government carried more of the risk, investors would require lower returns, potentially reducing the costs to build 
the first CCS facilities. The downside of this approach is that the government, and therefore taxpayers, would be 
exposed if risks materialised.  When designing the competition, the Department ruled out the option of 
government carrying more risk through ownership or part-ownership of projects at the first stage of its options 
appraisal, as this conflicted with government policy that the private sector should lead on investment in new 
energy infrastructure and bear the majority of risk.”  
 
 
The notion that government should bear more risk to encourage investment in CCS was 
recommended by the Parliamentary Advisory Group on CCS in the Lord Oxburgh Report.  The 
report recommended that the UK government should establish a CCS delivery company (a 
                                                
66 TEN-E Regulation, Article 4 1.(c); Ramboll & Ecorys, Report for the European Commission, ‘Support the 
Selection Process of PCI Candidates in the Thematic Area of Cross-Border Carbon Dioxide Networks: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis Methodology and PCI Application Template Final Report (21 February 2017).  
67 Ramboll & Ecorys, Report for the European Commission, ‘Support the Selection Process of PCI Candidates in 
the Thematic Area of Cross-Border Carbon Dioxide Networks: Cost-Benefit Analysis Methodology and PCI 
Application Template Final Report (21 February 2017) 8. 
68 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Department for Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy, ‘Carbon capture and storage: the second competition for government support’ (20 January 2017) 
35 <www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Carbon-Capture-and-Storage-the-second-competition-for-
government-support.pdf>. 
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parent company) comprising two separate subsidiaries:  1) PowerCo which will deliver power 
stations (CO2 source) and 2) T&SCo which manages transport and storage.69   
 
The rationale for this proposed model was that a first project should be full chain to initiate CCS 
deployment, but once multiple sources and sinks are connected, then flexibility in the ownership 
model could be introduced.  In addition, the Parliamentary Advisory group opined that “[f]ull-
chain risk is a risk the private sector cannot take, or cannot cost-effectively take, on the first 
projects. Taking early full-chain risk is a key reason for the formation of the [CCS delivery 
company]”.70 
 
Following from the Lord Oxburgh Report, in Feburary 2017, a report was issued by Teesside 
Collective and Poyry Management Consulting for the development of an industrial CCS project 
in northeast England (Teesside Collective Report).71  The proposal was based on the model 
presented in the Lord Oxburgh Report, in which the government shares much of the project risk.  
The report “proposes a business model that could make cost-effective, near-term investment in 
CCS attractive to the Government and to Energy Intensive Industries (EIIs) and so form a basis 
to enable the Government and industry to jointly to take forward delivery of Industrial CCS”.72  
Under the Teesside Collective proposal, the government is assigned the risk for T&SCo 
activities, whereas government and industry share the risk for capture facilities.  Industry 
supplies the CO273. 
 
As such, the Teesside Collective report focuses on the commercial aspects of project delivery.  
The commercial structures are beyond the scope of the current paper and this section, which 
examines partnership arrangements from the perspective of law and policy.74 However, one 
aspect of the Teesside Collective report is particularly salient to the current discussion, and that 
is the idea that in structuring value chain integration for CCS, the financial and technological 
capacity of the participants is relevant.  As explained in the Teesside report: 
 
“As a group, EIIs do not have the financial capacity of oil & gas companies or traditional 
energy utilities, and initiatives to decarbonise these industrial sectors have to recognise their 
financial attributes.  In particular, EIIs almost universally do not have the balance sheet 
strength to take on significant liabilities, such as the carbon cost liability in the unlikely event 
of a CO2 leakage from the carbon store. Any viable business model for industrial CCS has to 
recognise this”.75   
 
This observation highlights that robust policy and legal structures to encourage CCS investment 
and enable full value chain integration should consider the risk appetite of the project 
participants.  That is, a one size fits all policy framework may not be suitable.  
                                                
69 Lord Oxburgh, ‘Lowest Cost Decarbonisation for the UK: The Critical Role of CCS.  Report to the Secretary of 
State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy from the Parliamentary Advisory Group on Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS)’ (2016).  
70 Lord Oxburgh, ‘Lowest Cost Decarbonisation for the UK: The Critical Role of CCS.  Report to the Secretary of 
State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy from the Parliamentary Advisory Group on Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS)’ (2016) 28. 
71 Poyry & Teesside Collective, ‘A Business Case for a UK Industrial CCS Support Mechanism: A report on behalf 
of and in partnership with Teesside Collective’ (February 2017) <www.teessidecollective.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/0046_TVCA_ICCSBusinessModels_FinalReport_v200.pdf>. 
72 Poyry & Teesside Collective, ‘A Business Case for a UK Industrial CCS Support Mechanism: A report on behalf 
of and in partnership with Teesside Collective’ (February 2017) 1 <www.teessidecollective.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/0046_TVCA_ICCSBusinessModels_FinalReport_v200.pdf>. 
73 See proposed commercial on page 18 of the Teesside Collective Report. 
74 In addition, it is noted that GATEWAY Deliverable 4.3, which is being developed concurrent to the present 
paper, presents the business case for the Pilot Case. 
75 Poyry & Teesside Collective, ‘A Business Case for a UK Industrial CCS Support Mechanism: A report on behalf 
of and in partnership with Teesside Collective’ (February 2017) 11 <www.teessidecollective.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/0046_TVCA_ICCSBusinessModels_FinalReport_v200.pdf>. 
 19 
 
4.4: Risk Allocation Across the Value Chain  
 
The allocation and management of risk across the value chain, and which involve public and 
private actors also have implications for plausible partnership arrangements.  We collected 
stakeholders’ views on how risk should be shared between the private and public sector in the 
value chain.76  This brief questionnaire conducted in the February 2017 stakeholder engagement 
meeting reveals a general consistency in opinions among CCS stakeholders.  That is, generally, 
government should bear the long-term liability risk for CO2 storage, while CCS operators should 
manage the risk during the operations phase of the project.   
 
Assuming the Pilot project is classified as a PCI, determination of cost sharing structures 
between government and private sector participants will need to occur during the April 2019 to 
April 2021 timeframe.  However, discussions with governments will need to occur in the months 
and years leading to this decision, requiring involvement of both the UK and Dutch 
governments.  These should be held with the above explored country contexts and dynamics in 
mind, and also that those timeframes are already upon us. 
 
 
5: Timelines & Legal Strategy 
 
5.1: Introduction 
 
The final aim of this paper is to provide a legal strategy for developing project partners and 
allocating risk with national authorities. This includes the development of a timeline which will 
be instructive in terms of thinking of the legal hurdles for the potential of a Pilot project for CO2 
transport in the EU and when it is likely to happen.  
 
5.2: The Timeline 
 
As can be seen below in Figure 2, there is a potential misalignment between the project’s legal 
milestones and technical milestones, particularly with regard to the EIA process.  However, in 
terms of the Pilot project it is of benefit the ROAD project completed an EIA in 2011.  The 
content of this should be updated for a new application and under new EIA regulations.  In 
addition, it should be noted that the timelines below are merely estimates.  The actual timing for 
resolution of these issues could vary—particularly as they involve negotiations between 
sovereigns in which negotiation timeframes could be influenced by other factors.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
76 This was collected at the Gateway Stakeholder engagement meeting in February 2017. 
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Figure 2 A Preliminary Prediction of the Legal Timeline for Development of a PCI CCS project  
 
 
5.3: Member State Support 
 
Support of the Member State governments of the countries involved in the Pilot Case (i.e. the 
Netherlands and UK initially) would be necessary (Project Member States).  Having one 
Member State lead in engaging other national governments would be useful for efficient 
resolution of international law issues.   
 
In the Pilot projecte, the Netherlands is the primary host country (having both storage facilities 
and CO2 infrastructure).  Therefore, it would be logical for the project promoter to approach the 
government of the Netherlands initially, given the fundamental role of this nation in the Pilot 
Case and PCI application.  Ultimately, the decision as to which country should lead in engaging 
other participating Member States, or the project promoter seeks the initial support of another 
country will be a commercial and political one.   
 
The Pilot project’s current project development proposal focuses on the Netherlands with the 
first transboundary link being between the UK and the Netherlands (Fizzy extension).  
Therefore, it would be prudent to encourage dialogue between the governments of the UK and 
Netherlands to progress discussions on matters of international law in the other items of this 
communication plan.   
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5.4: Timeline in Detail  
 
(i) Q2 2017  
 
PCI Participation 
The PCI classification process needed submission by April 2017 forwhich there were three CCS 
related applications submitted.  A test for PCI classification is not whether a proposed project 
will cross an international boundary between Member States, but rather whether the project 
would have a ‘significant cross-border impact’.  This will require early participation and 
coordination of at least two eligible countries relevant to the Pilot Case.  
 
(ii) 2016 – Q2 2017 
 
Form of Agreement – Statutory Framework and Contracting Strategy 
The form(s) of agreement that Member States will use to establish a regulatory and statutory 
regime to enable the transboundary transport of CO2 for A Pilot project must be agreed.  
 
Any international agreements should be structured in a format that provides flexibility and 
accounts for future expansion efforts, thereby readily enabling participation of additional 
Member States.  However, the form and format of these agreements between sovereigns will be 
determined ultimately by those governments.   
 
The form of agreement could be documented through one or several of the following options: 
 
• Multilateral or bilateral treaties among or between the Participating Member States; 
• Framework Agreement (e.g., similar to the UK/Norway Framework Agreement, which 
addresses transboundary upstream petroleum infrastructure); or77 
• Non-binding Memorandum of Understanding which sets out the agreed international 
principles concerning CCS. 
 
In addition, the form of agreement would also be influenced by the discussion platform for 
international engagements.  For example, if the Pilot project Member States elect to establish the 
statutory regime multilaterally, with consideration for other CCS projects or future expansion of 
the Pilot Case either regionally or more broadly, then they may decide to do so through a 
platform such as the NSBTF. 
 
Therefore, participating Member States should decide the form of agreement for international 
legal issues, as well as the appropriate platform for discussions and for establishing the 
international agreement.   
 
(iii) Possible Timing: 2017 - 2018 
 
International Matters – London Protocol 
Pilot project Member States, as signatories to the London Protocol, will need to agree how to 
resolve the London Protocol CO2 export restriction.  This could be documented in the same 
agreement in which the other international law issues are addressed or separately.  Consideration 
should also be given to the form of agreement as noted above.   
 
                                                
77 Element Energy, ‘One North Sea’ (2010, Report for The Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and The 
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office) 
<www.npd.no/Global/Engelsk/3%20%20Publications/Reports/OneNorthSea/OneNortSea_Final.pdf>. 
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Resolution of this issue in the near term would be pertinent for the CO2 exporting Member 
States and CO2 storage Member State (Netherlands) of the Pilot Case.  Otherwise, investment 
and operation of the project could be stifled due to CO2 export being in contravention to the 
London Protocol. However, in the longer term, it would be sensible that the European 
Commission takes a leading role to resolve to the London Protocol restriction in order to enable 
CCS to be deployed more broadly in Europe, requiring offshore storage of CO2.    
 
 
(iv) Possible Timing:  2018 – 2021 
 
Resolution of Cross-Jurisdictional Issues – Statutory Framework Creation and 
Implementation 
The transboundary nature of the project requires standardization of national laws, which will 
need to be addressed in the international agreement (in whichever form of agreement is decided) 
and with legal effect applied at the national and local levels of law, if and where required. As 
noted previously, there is currently no plan to develop an EU-wide CO2 network. While a 
project-specific statutory framework could be created, the participating Member States may wish 
to consider future expansion possibilities.   
 
• Differences in Member States’ national laws and regulations of pipelines and CO2 purity 
requirements. 
• Means by which to resolve the CCS requirement that Member States must consult to 
ensure consistent application of the Directive in the event of third party access disputes. 
 
Establishment of international agreements, governing full chain transboundary CCS between 
sovereigns will take time.  This could require an extended period of negotiations and discussions 
and is subject to variability. 
 
(v) Possible Timing: 2018 – 2021 
 
Ownership Structures 
Ownership structures of the GATEWAY Pilot Case feasibly would require that operatorship of 
CO2 transport infrastructure and liabilities are shared between the private and public sectors.  
Project Member States will need to agree the model for allocation of risk between governments 
and private sector project participants, accounting for the full CCS value chain and 
transboundary transportation of CO2.  Management of risk may also include exploration of 
insurance instruments to support the private sector.    
 
For the GATEWAY Pilot Case, operation of the CCS value chain is segmented, such that the 
operator of the CO2 storage site will be a different entity to CO2 suppliers and CO2 transport 
operator.  The participating Member States should consider the Pilot Case’s constraints when 
determining a suitable risk allocation.  In doing so, the allocation of risk across the value chain 
would need to be contemplated by the parties—commercial discussions that are beyond the 
scope of the current paper. 
 
(v) Possible Timing: 2018 
 
Social Licence 
As stated previously, public support for CCS projects can be critical to project success.  Public 
engagement should be undertaken by participating Member States and project participants.  
Before final approval of the project, public engagement will occur through the EIA process.  
Parties may wish to document how this engagement would be undertaken and aligned across 
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borders in agreements. Member States may wish to explore this item in the international 
agreements established to govern the Pilot Case (or other transboundary CCS projects).  
 
(vi) Timing: 2017 - ongoing 
 
Evolution of CCS Network 
Beyond the Pilot Case, widespread deployment of CCS in Europe will require the coordination 
and development of standards for the CCS industry.  Ideally, this would be undertaken by a 
centralized entity (e.g., ACER).   
 
The evolution of the electricity and natural gas sectors in Europe are informative of how 
regulation of CO2 transport networks could develop (e.g., unbundling under the Third Energy 
Package, creation of ACER as a pan-EU coordinator, creation of standards and management 
efforts of ENTSO-E and ENTSO-G).  As mentioned previously, widespread commercial 
deployment of CCS in Europe is not anticipated until 2030. 
 
(vii) Possible Timing: 2025+ 
 
Project Timeline 
Currently, the timeline proposed in the PCI application proposes a series of engineering design 
activities to commence in the period of 2017 – 2019, followed by construction commencement 
in 2020 and startup between 2022 and 2024.  In Figure 2 above we have expanded on the 
proposed technical works timeline to include negotiation of partnership arrangements.  
Negotiation of project-level agreements are also noted to highlight the potential long lead times 
for the delivery of the commercial and legal arrangements for the CCS project.  Figure 2 
highlights the expected timeline when factoring in legal processes. 
 
 
6: Conclusion & Future Outlook 
 
6.1: Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was fourfold:  (1) to provide a statutory framework for a legal setting to 
pursue the Pilot Case provided with the required authority and autonomy; (2) to assess candidate 
owners, and to secure the required level of authority within the nations involved; (3) to suggest 
potential partnership arrangements from a legal and policy perspective; and (4) to provide a 
communication plan covering legal issues to be raised when soliciting partnership with national 
authorities. 
 
This paper highlighted several key issues for developing and resolving legal issues around 
ownership and risk and utilized a Pilot project to explore specific examples of this. First, the 
review of the statutory framework for a legal setting to enable the Pilot Case revealed the unique 
challenges of the Pilot Case when compared to other CCS projects in operation. The 
transboundary transportation of CO2 gives rise to international legal issues not faced in other 
standalone CCS projects or domestic projects. While the CCS Directive establishes a framework 
for CCS, it does not address transboundary transportation with specificity.  Moreover, unlike the 
U.S. and Canada, where a federal ‘hook’ enables streamlined regulation of transboundary CO2 
pipelines, such a regime is lacking in the EU currently. This will require participating Member 
States to agree a statutory framework for CO2 transport, which addresses issues at the 
international, national and local levels of law.  
 
Second, we considered ownership arrangements and government participation in the Pilot Case.  
The need for government ownership in a nascent CCS industry has been acknowledged such as 
in the UK in the Lord Oxburgh report. The sharing of ownership interests between government 
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and the private sector could be concurrent or sequential.  Moreover, ownership interest can vary 
across the CCS value chain. Ownership has a direct relationship with risk sharing and 
management between project parties/owners. In the GATEWAY project, the ownership model 
will exist in a full chain CCS project that traverses the borders of Member States, in which 
different operators found in each stage of the value chain.  This introduces complexity, requiring 
the participation and agreement of several Member States (initially being the UK and the 
Netherlands in the Rotterdam Nucleus case). Moreover, the ownership model has to be agreed, 
the structure of which is currently unknown for the Rotterdam Nucleus. 
 
Next, we explored potential partnership arrangements from a legal and policy perspective. 
Project support from participating Member States will be essential. This will require the project 
promoter to seek early support of and participation in the PCI application by Member States.   
 
Finally, a communication plan was advanced, which sets out key issues to be addressed with 
Member States when partnerships must be established.  As resolution of many issues require the 
agreement of sovereign nations, we highlighted the potential long lead times of these items for 
early international CCS projects (such as the Pilot project).  The extended time periods to 
resolve international legal matters for CCS could result in project delays.  These challenges 
could be overcome in the future, using a standardized regulatory model (such as observed in the 
natural gas industry in the EU) as well as the involvement of a transnational coordinator (such as 
ACER). 
 
6.2: Future Research 
 
Several areas of future research are recommended.  One recommended area of investigation is a 
more detailed consideration of risk management on ownership models in the creation of 
international statutory frameworks for full chain CCS.  ‘Liability’ is a broad term, yet there are 
many types of liability associated with long-term CCS storage, such as leakage liability or 
monitoring liability, all liabilities, as well as the legal instruments surrounding these (e.g., 
indemnification, insurance).78  This is a further complexity to the creation of a standardized 
framework for transboundary transport of CO2. Lessons from the nuclear energy sector for the 
CCS industry in terms of the operation of liability could be informative here. 
 
Another area for investigation is the impact of Brexit on delivering connectivity of CCS 
infrastructure between the UK and Europe.  Brexit will evolve in the coming months, which 
could have a result on the terms by which CCS infrastructure between Europe and the UK is 
delivered.   
 
It is also recommended that an investigation of best practices of the regulation of CCS in the 
North Sea is undertaken in the context of expanding this regulatory regime across Europe.  The 
North Sea could evolve to become a CO2 storage hub for Europe.  Where statutory frameworks 
for CCS projects are developed on a project-by-project or regional basis, the result could be that 
regional activities dictate outcomes in the Energy Union.   
 
                                                
78  IEAGHG, ‘Financial Mechanisms for Long-Term CO2 Storage Liabilities’ (November 2012) 
<http://ieaghg.org/docs/General_Docs/Reports/2012-11.pdf>. 
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APPENDIX 1:  ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACER European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
ACTL Alberta CO2 Trunk Line 
BEIS UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
CAD Canadian Dollars 
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage 
CEF Connecting Europe Facility 
CO2 Carbon Dioxide 
CSA Canadian Standards Association 
ECT Energy Charter Treaty 
EII Energy Intensive Industry 
EOR Enhanced Oil Recovery 
EU European Union 
FEED Front End Engineering and Design 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
MTPA Million Tons Per Annum 
NAO National Audit Office 
NSBTF North Sea Basin Task Force 
PCI Project of Common Interest 
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
TEN-E Trans-European Energy Networks 
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APPENDIX 2: STAKEHOLDER INPUT – RISK ALLOCATIONS 
 
In Stakeholder meeting 3 (see appendix 3), we asked participants’ views on how risk should be 
allocated among project participants in a full value chain CCS project, both during operations 
and long-term storage.  This brief questionnaire conducted in the stakeholder engagement 
meeting, reveals a general consistency in opinions among CCS stakeholders.  That is, generally, 
government should bear the long-term liability risk for CO2 storage, while CCS operators should 
manage the risk during the operations phase of the project.   
 
Stakeholders	
		 Operation	 Storage	
No.	
CO2	
Supplier	 Transport	 Storage	 Govt	
CO2	
Supplier	 Transport	 Storage	 Govt	
1	 30	 0	 70	 0	 30	 0	 70	 0	
2	 0	 0	 0	 100	 0	 0	 0	 100	
3	 0	 100	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 100	
4	 30	 30	 40	 0	 0	 0	 20	 80	
5	 60	 10	 30	 0	 0	 0	 0	 100	
6	 20	 20	 60	 0	 0	 0	 0	 100	
7	 30	 30	 30	 10	 0	 0	 30	-50	 50	-70	
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APPENDIX 3: STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
This Deliverable was completed with the following points of stakeholder engagement. 
 
(1) The legal issues at international, national and local level were discussed with Gateway 
expert project team members at Gateway project meetings over the first 18 months of the 
project.  
(2) Stakeholder Meetings 1 and 2 were held in Brussels in November 2015 and September 
2016, respectively.  Work Package 3 (the legal analysis) was highlighted and was 
discussed.  Feedback from the stakeholders was incorporated into the analysis for 
previous Work Package 3 Deliverables, which also informed the present Deliverable. 
(3) Deliverable 3.3 comprised semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, in which their 
views of risks of value chain CCS were explored.  That research also informed the 
research for this Deliverable 3.2. 
(4) A further presentation to stakeholders was made at Stakeholder Meeting 3 in London in 
February 2017.  Feedback from the stakeholders at this meeting was incorporated into 
the analysis for this Deliverable. 
Stakeholder attendance has included:  
 
Stakeholder Meeting 1 – 
November 2015 
Stakeholder Meeting 2 – 
September 2016 
Stakeholder Meeting 3 – February 
2017 
AdeB 
BP International Limited 
CCA association 
E3G 
European Commission, DG 
Energy  
Global CCS Institute 
Heidelberg Cement 
Maasvlakte CCS Project CV 
National Grid 
Netherlands Enterprise 
Agency 
Norwegian Research Council 
Shell 
Statoil 
TAQA 
The Crown Estate 
University of Edinburgh 
ZEP  
CCSA  
CCSA / ZEP Secretariat  
E3G  
EU CCS Network 
European Commission, DG 
Energy  
Global CCS Institute  
Group Technology BP  
Maasvlakte CCS Project C.V.  
Shell  
Statoil  
Sustainable Decisions Ltd  
TAQA  
ZEP  
 
UK CCS Research Council 
(UKCCSRC) 
TAQA 
Maasvlakte CCS Project CV 
CCS Association 
International Energy Agency 
Port of Rotterdam 
Swift Exploration 
Dentons 
 
 
 
